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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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29 August 1985

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LACK OF INITIATIVE KEY WEAKNESS AMONG YOUNG COMMANDERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 85 (signed to press 20 Mar 85) pp 38-43

[Article by Gds Maj Gen L. Zolotov, commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman Division imeni M.I. Kalinin, under the rubric "Combat Training and Military Indoctrination"; "There Are no Promoters in Combat..."]

[Text] The tank company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Taratukhin went through the training battle essentially without even beginning it. When it was making the march to the departure area for the offensive, it was unable to cross a swampy area. Considerable time went by while the tankmen were extricating the first combat vehicles to become bogged down in the quagmire. The company was late for the beginning of the attack, and the exercise director therefore gave it an unsatisfactory rating.

During the critique of the exercise it was learned that Guards Senior Lieutenant Taratukhin had knowingly led the company into the swampy area. The commander of the patrol vehicle had informed him that the tanks could not cross the swamp. Nonetheless, the officer had ignored such an obvious danger. Why had he done so?

"The route was set by the battalion commander, and I did not have the right to alter it," was how Guards Senior Lieutenant Taratukhin himself answered the question.

Can this explanation be considered valid, however? Of course not. The battalion commander had set the route for the tank company based on the fact that the swamp had frozen during the extreme cold and that tanks were perfectly capable of traveling over it. The temperature had risen during the night for the exercise, however, and the ice cover had thawed. Naturally, this made it necessary to make certain adjustments in the march decision. The battalion commander was busy with other things, however, and failed to do so. The company commander was afraid to take on the responsibility and alter the route on his own.

Unfortunately, we encounter such cases, in which an officer demonstrates indecision and performs without initiative in a training battle, looking to his superiors. Furthermore, this is true not just of those who still do not have enough experience, but of certain battalion commanders as well.

For example, Guards Major V. Dudin performed with adequate confidence in a regimental tactical exercise, and this predetermined to a significant degree the good rating received by the subunit he commands. Literally a few weeks later, however, the battalion suffered a failure. It was caused by the same thing--inadequately developed independence. In the first exercise the battalion commander was mainly executing the will of the regimental commander. And he did so conscientiously and precisely. With respect to the second training battle, however, all responsibility for its outcome lay on the shoulders of Guards Major Dudin himself. It proved to be too much for him. Without a sense of support from his senior chief, he made a number of errors in assessing the situation and adopted far from the best decision, which naturally did not help to carry out the assigned mission well.

What is the matter? Why is it that certain officers sometimes lack initiative in the field exercises, cannot take a step, so to speak, without the approval of their senior commander? The answer has to be that the necessary qualities were not developed in them, that they were not taught to be independent, to demonstrate combat activeness, initiative and boldness in their tactical thinking.

The development of a commander is a lengthy process. It begins back at the military school. This is where the idea must be developed in the mind of the future officer that the one who is victorious on the battlefield is primarily the one who does not merely conscientiously carry out the combat order issued by the commander, but supplements it with his own inventiveness, his own intelligent initiative and creativity. The one who possesses flexible tactical thinking and does not avoid military stratagems. Finally, the one who makes skillful use not only of the subunit's capabilities and of attached and supporting personnel and equipment for achieving victory over the enemy, but also of his own main weapon--a honed, constantly straining, searching mind.

I cannot say that all of the military VUZ graduates arrive in our division with these qualities, with this kind of special orientation. They include officers who lose their heads even in situations which are not difficult, who cannot make a decision without the commander's prompting and do not attempt to demonstrate independence. Naturally, this can be corrected if the young officer ends up under an experienced and competent commander, on a team known for its creative atmosphere. In this case he will always acquire with time real combat maturity and the qualities essential to a commander. It is worse when the recent cadet begins his service as a lieutenant in a subunit or unit in which the commander and staff are guilty of excessive tutelage in their work with the personnel, where the party and Komsomol organizations do not concern themselves with developing the newcomers into commanders. In such cases the young officers frequently rise in rank and position but do not acquire a commander's independence. Furthermore, even those who show promise as creative and imaginative men in the beginning sometimes become sluggish.

One does not have to go far for examples, as they say. Let us return to Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Taratukhin. People in the unit recall how he demonstrated presence of mind, intelligent initiative and independence in a difficult situation while he was still a platoon commander. The explanation

for the change which occurred in the young commander should be sought primarily in the changed atmosphere in the regiment.

For a number of years that unit won first place in the socialist competition among the tank regiments and was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the district military council. The commander, the secretary of the party committee and three battalion commanders were replaced in the regiment, however, and the results began to drop. In a general way, this was only natural: after all, none of those newly occupying the positions had any experience in their new command positions. The correct thing to do in this situation would have been not to force events but, as they gradually acquired experience, to build-up their efforts to improve the training and indoctrinational process. In the regiment they took a different, clearly erroneous route, however, and began substituting for and excessively watching over the platoon, company and even battalion commanders, assuming that they would achieve the necessary result in this way.

The result was just the opposite, however. The excessive tutelage, as a kind of lack of trust, had a negative effect on the attitude of the men. The mechanically precise performance of one's duties "from this point to that point" gradually became established in the officer training classes and tactical exercises, but attempts at independence were not particularly welcomed. It was felt that this reduced the likelihood of error and increased the possibility of achieving better results in the exercises. Life disproved those views, however. The very first test exercises revealed serious deficiencies in the training of certain subunit commanders in that unit.

A great deal of time and effort will be required to correct the situation in the tank regiment. And not just of members of the division's command element and staff, but of workers in the political section as well. It turned out that the unit party committee and the party organizations were unable to take a principled position in the existing situation and to influence the obviously disturbing climate in the collective. Guards Colonel M. Surkov and Guards Lieutenant Colonels Ye. Statsenko and N. Kiselev, workers with the political section, are helping the party committee secretary and the secretaries of the battalion party organizations to alter primarily the climate in the party collectives and increase the creative activeness, initiative and principle of the communists, most of whom are officers directly involved in organizing the training process.

The former creative climate is still not being established in the regiment as rapidly as one would like, however. This continues to have a negative effect on the attitude of certain commanders toward the training, toward the improvement of their tactical skill and the expansion of their military perspective. Although one now encounters less frequently officers who wait for instructions "from above" on the slightest occasion and are afraid to assume responsibility for a bold and imaginative decision, they still exist in the regimental collective.

The example cited demonstrates the importance of the moral climate in the collective for the successful development of the young officers as commanders.

At the same time, the commander acquires combat maturity only in the course of purposeful training and independent work to expand his knowledge.

Marxist-Leninist training for the officer personnel is the basis for the successful shaping of commanders. This is because political maturity and ideological conviction predetermine the commander's other morale qualities and fighting efficiency and his will for victory. A thorough knowledge of Marxist-Leninist methodology provides the officer with the key, figuratively speaking, to an understanding not just of the general laws and patterns of armed conflict, but also of the nature of the contemporary combined arms battle, of the processes and developments occurring in it, and of the dialectical interdependence and mutual influence of its components. This means that we need to see to it that every officer constantly improves in the ideological-theoretical respect.

Political section workers, regimental commanders, their deputies for political affairs, party committees and subunit party organizations are performing a considerable amount of work for this purpose. The independent work of the communists-and-officers is being monitored, and progressive experience is being summarized and disseminated. Theoretical talks with the officers on the most important party documents have also become a practice.

The more thoroughly the officers understand party policy and the party's demands, the more responsible they feel about improving their professional skill. In group field practice, short tactical exercises and regular exercises, many of our commanders work persistently to learn how to organize combat, to control the subunits, to conduct vigorous and determined combat operations in difficult situations, including a situation in which the enemy employs weapons of mass destruction.

Actually, the greatest results are obtained where the main demand made of the training methods is taken into account. According to Marshall of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense, this demand is that conditions actually be created in the drills and exercises, which not only demand, but actually force the commanders to employ military strategems, techniques of action not anticipated by the enemy and bold maneuvering on the battlefield.

Now and then, unfortunately, one encounters cases in which certain of those in charge fail to consider significant tactical training issues when they organize the officer training and do not refine the officers' ability to thoroughly analyze the situation, to foresee changes in the situation, take them into account and make well based decisions assuring success in the combat operations. Or else, and this is also bad, they conduct the tactical exercises according to a fixed pattern and do not saturate them with various hypothetical situations forcing the commander to demonstrate sharpness and efficiency in his tactical thinking.

Elements of indulgence were to be found in one of the exercises conducted by the regimental commander with Guards Major A. Maltsev's battalion. It was held on a thoroughly familiar section of the range, the targets were arranged

in a line and not disposed in depth, and the "enemy" was represented as weak, lacking initiative and incapable of decisive action. In addition, many important questions having to do with organizing interaction with attached and supporting subunits were omitted when the offensive was planned. Just how could this develop initiative and resourcefulness, combat activeness and military cunning?

It is not easy, of course, to create an instructive tactical situation on a range which is known inside out, so to speak. Especially if the exercise involves field firing: the firing lines are equipped with stationary erectors which cannot be moved to new positions. Nonetheless, outstanding commanders can place their subordinates in circumstances even on a familiar range, which forces them to strain both their strength and their knowledge in order precisely to wrest victory from the "enemy."

Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Zhuravlev, commander of a motorized rifle regiment and initiator of socialist competition in the Ground Forces, among others, always provides for numerous unexpected situations when he sets up an exercise. He will select an "inconvenient" direction of attack (this is perfectly possible in real combat), for example, plan several hypothetical situations capable of stumping even the most experienced battalion commander (the "enemy" once "employed" high-precision weapons against Guards Major A. Balashov's battalion, for example), supplement the training target layout with individual targets located in the most unexpected places, and so forth. Victory does not come easily to the commanders in this situation. The officers in the regiment rapidly acquire maturity as commanders, however. Many of them are ordinarily bold and decisive, even daring in their own way, in a training battle.

The regimental party organization exerts considerable influence both on the quality and effectiveness of the officer training as a whole and on the development of the officers' creative initiative and independence. What forms and methods does it use?

First of all, it does so by increasing the responsibility of the communists and assuring that they are in the vanguard and set a good personal example. The party committee maintains unweakening control over the professional growth of officers-and-communists. And if one of them lowers his pace in the training, prepares poorly for a training activity or does not go over the recommended subject on his own, party pressure is immediately applied to the individual.

This was true, for example, when Guards Major V. Gorbachev and Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Tolopilo performed indecisively and without initiative in one of the test exercises and were given low ratings. Those communists had to answer to the party committee members and to listen to justified criticism. The party demandingness prompted them to be more serious about the training.

Questions pertaining to the personal exemplariness of the communists in mastering skills in organizing combat and directing the subunits are regularly discussed at party meetings and sessions of the party committee there, and are

constantly at the focus of attention of the party organizations of the regimental directorate, the battalions and companies.

At one time omissions began to show up in the organization of the officer training in the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Guards Major A. Galkin. Party committee members and the unit command element investigated the causes of the situation. Certain commanders and political workers were not adequately familiar with the guiding documents, and planning discipline had grown lax in the subunit. Naturally, the regimental commander took immediate steps to correct the shortcomings. The party committee in turn concerned itself with increasing the responsibility of the communists in charge for the quality of the officer training. Reports were presented by communist and leader Guards Major V. Nazarov and Guards Major A. Galkin, CPSU members. A talk based on principle was also conducted with the other communists about the need to raise the level of planning for the training, to exercise stricter control over the course of the officer training and to assist the battalion commander with the organization of socialist competition among the officers. Communists in the headquarters party organization and the battalion party collective seriously discussed tasks involved in increasing their influence upon the effectiveness of the training.

The party committee and the subunit party organizations are making an important contribution to the publicizing of progressive experience and the imaginative and decisive actions of the best commanders.

I recall a tactical exercise conducted in the battalion commanded by Guards Captain Ye. Merkulov. It involved many interesting and instructive things. The exercise director had created a tactical setting which demanded that the battalion commander employ the parallel work method. Guards Captain Merkulov and the other subunit officers passed the difficult test. With an acute shortage of time and a situation not precisely defined, they were able to work out by phases the optimal battle plan and then to successfully execute it.

During the offensive the officers in the battalion performed not merely competently, but with resourcefulness and initiative. For example, when the battalion commander received the order to occupy an advantageous line and repel an "enemy" counterattack, he did not commit the second echelon to the battle. He could see that companies in the first echelon were reaching the advantageous line ahead of the counterattackers and used fire from an attached tank company and artillery battalion to support them. He then carried out a strike against the substantially weakened "enemy" with the available forces, thereby preserving the second echelon for subsequent combat operations.

The decision, unexpected but quite correct in the given situation, was given high marks during the critique of the exercise. It would have seemed that since the tactical procedures had been officially approved, the matter could be left at that. The party activists reasoned otherwise, however. Summarizing the way in which that exercise was organized and the imaginative actions of the officers in the motorized rifle battalion in the exercise, they attempted to reveal the basis for the boldness of thought and the accuracy of



the calculations. These things were then described at a unit officers' meeting and in an issue of a special oral magazine.

It would be difficult to overstate the role of the staff in developing the qualities of commanders in the officers. The regimental staff officers take part on a mandatory basis in the preparation and the conduct of exercises with the battalions, and the battalion officers do so with the companies. They have a great deal to do with what those exercises are like--whether they are instructive and motivate the commanders to exercise creativity on the battlefield and to engage in a search, or, on the contrary, are uninteresting and routine and therefore do not contribute to the development of initiative and independence.

Unfortunately, we sometimes encounter cases in which staff officers limit their role to making up the maps for the exercise director and various planning documents. With respect to planning the training battle and to its material and technical support and the monitoring of those conducting the "combat operations," they feel these are exclusively the concern of the commander. We are convinced that this is a basically incorrect attitude.

It needs to be said that a determined campaign is conducted against this erroneous opinion in our division. The formation staff and communists in the staff party organization, which is headed by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Milovidov, make an important contribution to the campaign. When they help to work out the exercises, Guards Lieutenant Colonels N. Aksamentov and S. Salov, Guards Major A. Romanov and other officers attempt to create a complex situation, to saturate it with elements of unexpectedness, uncertainty and contradictoriness. They provide the trainees with a minimum of information on the "enemy," do not permit the opposing side to be portrayed as weak and passive, demand a creative attitude toward the preparation and conduct of the exercises on the part of staff officers of the regiments and battalions (batal'on, divizion), support and encourage imaginative plans and actions in every possible way. The division political section and the directorate party bureau give unweakened attention to the creative principle in the work style of the staff officers. All of this bears fruit. Most of the staff officers work earnestly to assure effective field training which contributes to the development of boldness of tactical thought, initiative and creativity in commanders at all levels.

...I heard the following statement recently, while attending a meeting with division veterans commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Victory and the feats of the Taman heroes during the Great Patriotic War: "There are no prompters in combat." It was uttered by Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel (Retired) Aleksandr Borisovich Kazayev, a regimental commander of front line times. He cited examples from his own combat past confirming the fact that victory is gained by those who are bold and imaginative, who are not afraid to assume responsibility for the outcome of the battle in a difficult situation.

I feel that we should not forget this fact even today, even though both the weapons and the nature of combat operations have undergone significant changes

during the four postwar decades. And we should prepare the commanders so that they do not wait to be prompted on the best way to strike the enemy, should they find themselves engaged in combat with an aggressor encroaching upon our nation, but can achieve victory in any situation by using the knowledge and skills acquired during their days of peacetime training and relying upon the moral-political qualities and fighting efficiency developed in them. This is one of the main tasks in improving the combat readiness of the units and sub-units. The commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations in the division are concentrating their efforts on systematically accomplishing that task.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

TAKING POSITIVE APPROACH TO ATHEISTIC WORK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 85 (signed to press 20 Mar 85) pp 61-65

[Article by Capt A. Pronin under the rubric "Komsomol Life": "Both Tact and a Knowledge of the Matter: Notes on the Effectiveness of the Atheistic Indoctrination"]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant V. Babich, Komsomol committee member, did not learn that Private S. Antoshkin, his subordinate, was under the influence of religious sentiments until a year after the soldier had joined the unit. When he learned about it, he was sincerely surprised:

"Antoshkin is a Baptist? I would never have believed it." He was silent for a moment and then added: "That's OK, we'll open up his eyes to the world. I'll have a talk with him myself, and I think the other Komsomol activists will also become involved."

Soon after that Private Antoshkin was invited to a meeting of the Komsomol bureau. The Komsomol activists told the soldier how foolish it was in the age of scientific-technical revolution and the conquering of outer space to believe in old wife's tales about the Lord and the "second coming".... Sensing the bewildered glances of his comrades, Antoshkin sat there, looking down, and did not even attempt to object. The activists interpreted his silence in their own way: it meant that he recognized his error. And a notation was made in the work plan of the Komsomol bureau: A discussion on the subject of atheism was conducted with Private Antoshkin.

A month after that "talk," the battalion commander received a letter from Antoshkin's father, in which the latter reported in an offended tone that his son, as he put it, was being "oppressed for his faith" and asked that Sergey "be left alone."

We can see that the attempt by the Komsomol activists to dispel Antoshkin's religious sentiments with a "cavalry attack" was unsuccessful. Furthermore, the soldier completely withdrew into himself after that talk. And it could all have been different, after all. It could have been, had Senior Lieutenant Babich and the other members of the Komsomol committee and bureau learned about his problem not a year after the soldier joined the unit, but immediately after

he arrived. If, upon learning about it, they had not been in too big a hurry to take him to task for his convictions. Finally, had they had even a slight knowledge of scientific atheism, learned about the particular features of the Baptist doctrine and conducted the talk with Antoshkin calmly and with good arguments. Incidentally, experience in working with individual religiously inclined servicemen has borne this out.

One evening, Captain A. Udod, a member of the regimental Komsomol committee, was passing by the sleeping quarters of one of the subunits and heard loud laughter coming from there. He glanced in and saw what was going on. Private Akram Khodzhayev was standing in a circle of his colleagues and making a great effort to wipe some enormous inkspots from his face. The officer began ascertaining who had poured ink on his comrade, and why.

"I did it as a joke," one of the soldiers admitted. He told the whole story.

He had noticed, it turned out, that Private Khodzhayev was keeping a bottle of some kind of water in his footlocker. He would take it out in the dark, so that no one could see him, and hurriedly wash his face with the contents. Upon seeing this, the soldier had up and dropped an ink tablet into the bottle. Khodzhayev had no way of knowing this and fell into the trap, so to speak.

The incident interested Udod. Even before serving in the Transcaucasus he had known about the ablution ritual performed by Muslims prior to praying. "Can Khodzhayev be a believer?" the Komsomol activist fell to thinking.

Anatoliy Vasilyevich began keeping an eye on Akram. From his personal observations and his unobtrusive, cautious questioning, Udod learned that the soldier was from a religiously inclined family and that he himself was to a certain degree under the influence of the Koran. Udod did not rush in immediately to prove to Khodzhayev that there is no God in heaven and that the "sacred book" of the Muslims is a collection of absurdities. The officer began by recommending that at its next meeting the company Komsomol bureau discussed the inadmissability of tactless acts and any sort of disrespect, even in the form of a joke, in relations among the servicemen. The subject was discussed. The company Komsomol activists then talked about it with their colleagues. And there was no repetition of such jokes.

Udod did not tell all of the activists about Khodzhayev. He told only Sergeant V. Smirnov and Private B. Allaverdiyev about the soldier's problem, only those who were known in the collective as especially sensitive and considerate individuals and were on friendly terms with Khodzhayev. The officer based his selection of assistants in such a delicate and difficult matter as atheistic indoctrination on his knowledge of the mentality of believers: any kind of pressure, any attempt to impose antireligious views in them only evokes alienation and forces them to withdraw into themselves. Udod set himself a different goal: to surround Khodzhayev with attention, to actively draw him into the affairs and concerns of the collective and help him rid himself of his religious delusions.

I shall not describe all of the antireligious propaganda measures conducted in the regiment. I shall only say that there were talks by lecturers criticizing various religious dogmas, including Muslim dogma. Films exposing the inhumane nature of religion were shown. Khodzhayev was present at all of these activities. The new, previously unknown information gradually shook the religious underpinnings of his outlook and forced him rapidly to understand himself and determine the truth. With the librarian's assistance, Sergeant Smirnov and Private Allaverdiyev selected works of fiction and journalistic works for their comrade, which rigorously exposed the church and religion, particularly the Muslim religion.

When they discussed with Private Khodzhayev what he had read, the Komsomol activists, on the advice of Captain Udod, attempted to make him aware of the impossibility of accomplishing anything important in life, anything of benefit to people, by following the commandments in the Koran. One of the main doctrines of Mohammedanism is that of predestination, according to which everything in the world happens through "God's will" and man is nothing more than a toy in the hands of fate. Destroying Khodzhayev's faith involved arousing his self-awareness. This is the first and perhaps the most important step on the path to getting rid of religious prejudices.

Some time later Udod himself had a talk with Khodzhayev. It was a confidential discussion. It touched upon both the soldier's outlook and everyday matters. Akram did not conceal the fact that he himself was now beginning to doubt many of the commandments in the Koran, particularly that which demands that a true believer patiently follow the path "marked out from above."

The soldier told the officer also that when he completed his army service he wanted to acquire a technical speciality and live in the capital of the Union republic, but that his parents were against this. They gave only one reason for this: it would not be "pleasing to Allah," they said.

Khodzhayev's candor gave the officer the idea of organizing and conducting an activity in the tank battalion, during which the fightingmen who had been training in various occupations prior to joining the army would tell about their special fields, about the romantics of creative labor....

Not immediately and not all at once, Khodzhayev's religious delusions gradually disappeared. He was released into the reserve a completely reborn person, as they say.

Experience with atheistic indoctrination has shown that when an individual is freed from the chains of religious dogmas, it is important to reveal to him moral values which he accepts with his mind and heart. One can therefore not stop half-way. When ridding the serviceman of the fear of "sin" and other prejudices, it is essential at the same time to equip him with a clear understanding of his duty to the homeland. The way the communists and Komsomol members equipped Private Sirozhiddin Khakimov. He is an Uzbek by nationality. He grew up in a religious family. When his mother and father saw their son off to the army, they instructed him to serve honorably, because this is "pleasing to God." And Sirozhiddin zealously fulfilled his duties as a

soldier. The secretary of the Komsomol committee in the unit in which Khakimov served, however, soon learned from personal talks that his zeal in the service stemmed not so much from a profound understanding of his patriotic duty as from his conviction that it is "sinful" to serve poorly. In order to have a reassessment of values occur in Khakimov's mind and for his awareness of duty to prevail over his "fear of sin," the Komsomol secretary began acquainting him with the heroic history and the glorious revolutionary, labor and combat traditions of the Uzbek people. He issued Khakimov an assignment to collect material on Uzbek soldiers who earned the great title Hero of the Soviet Union on the Great Patriotic War fronts and present a talk to his comrades. Another time Sirozhiddin, under an assignment from the company Komsomol bureau, prepared and presented a talk on Uzbekistan's distinguished workers, Heroes of Socialist Labor. A bright human ideal, free of concepts of "sin," gradually took shape in Khakimov's mind.

When one explains the harm of religion, demonstrates its baselessness and develops in the individual correct concepts of life's ideals, it is important to bring the believer around with specific deeds, to prove to him that not God and not the community of believers is his support at a difficult time, but the collective in which he serves or works. In other words, agitation in the form of deeds is needed.

Senior Lieutenant Fedor Semenov, member of the regimental Komsomol committee, knew that prior to being drafted into the army Private Igor Kayumov had attended meetings of a religious sect, that his parents were devout. Both the secretary himself and the commander and political worker performed the necessary work with the soldier, but they sensed that although Kayumov was listening to what they said, he was not changing his mind. They understood that the soldier's eyes would not be opened rapidly. It occurred far sooner than they thought, however. Just what happened?

The Komsomol secretary noticed that all of a sudden something was wrong with Kayumov. Semenov had a talk with him and learned that misfortune had struck his parents: their home had caught fire during a storm.

"It needs major repair work," Kayumov said with an effort, "but my elderly parents can't do it themselves."

That same evening Semenov met with the subunit deputy commander for political affairs and its commander. Together, they wrote a letter to the military commissariat. It requested assistance for Kayumov's parents.

A month passed. Kayumov came to Semenov and handed him a letter from his parents. It contained some joyous news: the house had been repaired. It expressed enormous gratitude to the individual who had written to the military commissariat.

"You know," Kayumov admitted to Semenov, "the words of my former 'spiritual fathers' about love for one's neighbor were only words. They did not lift a finger to help in a time of trouble."

Help had come from where Kayumov least expected it.

What does this example tell us? It tells us one thing: any demonstration of socialist collectivism, of its basic principle that "man is friend, comrade and brother to man," affects the strayed individual more powerfully than the most correct words.

People might ask me: If everything is going well for the believer, if he is not in need of urgent assistance, then what?

I believe that we cannot close our eyes to everyday matters. Helping to service an individual's vehicle, teaching him the subtleties of military life, even such things as how to sew on a collar lining or to select a uniform which fits--any demonstration of comradeship, of friendly feelings for the religious-minded individual is always fitting. And any demonstration of spiritual callousness toward such people, any indication of indifference or disrespect for their convictions is all the more inadmissible. In this area, much depends upon the stance taken by the Komsomol activists.

We know that the fog of religious prejudices is not dispelled by a single puff of wind. The examples cited, however, tell us that the veil will fall from the believer's eyes when words stated from a position of scientific atheism are backed up with actions for the good of the individual and with the ability not just to demonstrate one's correctness, but also to win respect and trust.

Reflecting on this, I would like to stress the following: knowledge is the basis for success in atheistic work. Profound, all-around knowledge, which is constantly being supplemented. Certain people might object, of course, and ask why a Komsomol activist needs such knowledge if there are no religious-minded servicemen in the collective. Let us not forget that while there is no one blinded by religion today, who knows about tomorrow. Perhaps one will appear. Our ideological enemies are highly active, after all, and they have not assigned a place of least importance to religion and the church in the psychological war they have unleashed. Modern missionaries operate in a refined manner and give their essentially anti-Soviet, antisocialist petty ideas attractive disguises in the form of various kinds of ethical teachings leading, they would have us believe, to "self-perfection and self-purification." They count mainly on the youth. But how can these criminal intrigues be unmasked without a proper body of knowledge?

Finally, we must not forget how strongly certain prejudices and superstitions cling to life in the minds of people and how persistently they are passed from one generation to the next. Do we not have many people today, including young people, who attach importance to "bad" dreams and who avoid crossing the path of a black cat? Or who believe that if they shake hands with a comrade across the threshold, they will have a falling out with him? Or who wear various kinds of amulets? And all of this has its roots in religion.

The religious exists not just among believers. Fantastic tales fabricated some time in the past and coming down to us in the form of biblical or other legends are sometimes related by people who are not at all religious but

have had contact with believers at some time. They tell the legends but are unable to interpret them correctly. How important it is in such a case for the Komsomol member not to be merely a listener. Unfortunately, however, far from all of them know what to say. In the following situation, for example.

It was lively in the Lenin room during the free hour. Private V. Kotin was leafing through a file of Ogonek magazines. A collection of colored pictures of paintings from the State Hermitage collection drew his attention. Kotin's glance was arrested by a reproduction of Rembrandt's painting "The Sacrifice of Abraham." Anyone familiar with this painting recalls that it depicts an angel removing from the hand of the old man a knife raised over a youth. The art scholars rank this work among the great Dutch master's outstanding art with respect to the intensity of the passion and the realism with which the dramatic situation is depicted.

After reading a short article in the magazine and not finding an explanation of the subject of Rembrandt's painting, Kotin showed the picture to a comrade sitting next to him and asked:

"Do you know what this is about"?

His neighbor shrugged his shoulders.

Lieutenant V. Chesnokov, a member of the unit Komsomol committee, entered the Lenin room at that time. Kotin considered the officer to be an informed individual and asked him to comment on the painting.

"It's some kind of Biblical subject," the Lieutenant answered without certainty, after thinking for a moment.

More specifically, he knew nothing about it. Generally speaking, there is nothing surprising about this: he had never in his life had a Bible in his hands.

"I can explain," Private Danilevskiy said, suddenly entering the discussion.

The soldiers fell silent.

"My grandmother is a believer," the soldier continued. "She told me the story when I was a child. According to her, tribal leader Abraham had a son named Isaac. God convinced him that Isaac should be sacrificed. He therefore dragged his son to the altar. He had already raised the knife over the son, when the Lord stopped him. It turned out that he had only wanted to test the strength of Abraham's faith. After becoming convinced of it, he had not wanted any bloodshed. 'We all walk under God, and he is merciful,' my grandmother was fond of saying."

Those present were silent for some time. The Komsomol activist was also silent, although he knew that he had to comment on what Danilevskiy had said. But what could he say? He could not think of anything. And so, he did not explain to the soldiers that evening that it is not a matter of "God's design."

Nor did he discuss the barbarian rites--sacrificing people to a "kind" God--which existed in early Christian and other religions and which are even described in the "Book of Morality" of the Christians and Jews--the Bible.

Chesnokov understood what he should have said to the soldiers later, after he had thoroughly studied "The Bible for Believers and Nonbelievers," written by the remarkable Soviet journalist Yemelyan Yaroslavskiy. He said nothing at the time, however. He said nothing, because he did not know either the legend of Isaac or the content of other widespread fables. After becoming informed, however, he addressed the soldiers. He stressed the fact that the artist had used the Biblical subject to appeal to the mercy of his contemporaries. Chesnokov then took the discussion in the following direction: the officer began to demonstrate convincingly and with arguments that the biblical God of the legends was cruel, calculating and vested with all the base qualities inherent in members of the exploiting classes from the time of the Old Testament to the present. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that one can only successfully dispel fables concocted by church-goers about an "all-powerful and merciful God, who looks after the welfare of people day and night" when one has a good knowledge of what they are about.

Our contemporary is acutely interested in the treasures of world culture. How many people walk through the halls of the Tretyakov Gallery and the Hermitage, the Museum of Ancient Russia imeni Andrey Rublev and the Fine Arts Museum imeni A.S. Pushkin each day! What demand there is for literature on art, albums, postcards and magazines with reproductions of the works of outstanding masters of the past! Many questions arise in the minds of those who see the legends of the flight into Egypt and the Annunciation, the crucifixion and the lamentation, the return of the prodigal son and manna from heaven told in the language of the brush and the chisel.... And how important it is for the answers to be precise and thorough and most important, for them to have an anti-religious orientation and not leave any room for admiring the "humane deeds" of the heroes of Biblical or other religious legends.

One can only help to open the eyes of an individual, help him to take the correct stance in life and finally, block the influence of modern "fishers of men" by working patiently and thoughtfully, by finding and citing the most convincing arguments, those which will truly open people's eyes to the truth. One cannot arm oneself with these arguments in a day, of course. Erudition and profound knowledge is acquired through daily, painstaking work. This is not a new truth. It is also the truth, however, that this work is noble work, for the individual lies behind it. An individual saved. Aleksandr Krivoshein, for example. He broke free of the influence of Catholicism in the army, and when he was released into the reserve he went to a Komsomol construction project. He became a shock worker of communist labor there. He recently wrote a letter to the unit. He thanked the commander and the political worker and naturally, the Komsomol activists for the fact that they had helped him to remove the veil from his eyes.

An individual tears away a web which has enveloped his mind and takes his place among the builders of the communist society.... He does not tear it away himself, of course. He is helped. Helped by the commander and the political

worker. Also by the Komsomol activists. Helped by people vested with both tact and a knowledge of things.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

DEFINING MODERN WARS: CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 85 (signed to press 20 Mar 85) pp 24-31

[Article\* by Capt 1st Rank A. Belyayev, doctor of philosophy, professor:  
"Scientific Concepts of Modern Warfare--An Important Element in the Awareness  
of the Soviet Fightingman"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] The foreign policy course of the CPSU and the Soviet State in the contemporary situation is focused entirely on accomplishing an urgent task of the contemporary era, that of halting the arms race, preventing the militarization of space, limiting, reducing and then completely eliminating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states. However, the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist nations cannot ignore the dangerous policy of the USA and NATO, aimed at preparing for an aggressive war against real socialism. "In the complex international situation," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, underscored in his speech at the special plenum of the party Central Committee on 11 March 1985, "It is important as never before to maintain our homeland's defense capability at a level which lets potential aggressors know very well that an encroachment upon the security of the Soviet Nation and its allies, upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a devastating retaliatory strike."

The Soviet Armed Forces have a special role in the defense of socialism; together with the armies of other fraternal nations, they vigilantly guard the socialist gains and peace on earth. In order to further build up the combat capability of the Armed Forces of the USSR, it is highly important for all categories of personnel to study the important problems of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, on the likely enemy and on being prepared to provide a devastating rebuff to any aggressor.

Lenin's analysis of imperialism is highly important for assessing the contemporary military-political situation in the world, for understanding the causes of its exacerbation and the sources of a possible war.

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\* This article is recommended for use in Marxist-Leninist training groups for officers when studying the subject: "The Important Problems of Developing in the Personnel a Correct Understanding of Modern Warfare, the Likely Enemy and a State of Readiness to Deliver a Devastating Rebuff to an Aggressor."

V.I. Lenin demonstrated that capitalism's internal conflicts become more acute and the aggressiveness of the monopolistic bourgeoisie increases sharply as it develops into imperialism. "Contemporary militarism," V.I. Lenin underscored, "is the result of capitalism. In both of its forms it is 'a vital manifestation' of capitalism: as a military force used by capitalist states in their external conflicts... and as a weapon used by the dominant classes to suppress any kind (economic or political) of movement of the proletariat..." ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 17, p. 187). These tenets reflect the most important feature of imperialism--the inclination to resort to armed force and wars of aggression. While capitalism has turned social development into an endless round of wars of conquest, imperialism, V.I. Lenin pointed out, "is distinguished in its basic /economic/ characteristics by the least degree of peace-lovingness and freedom-lovingness, by the universal and most extensive development of the military" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 37, p. 248).

Wars of aggression are imperialism's constant companion. They are becoming increasingly devastating and are drawing dozens of states and hundreds of millions of people into their sphere. Imperialism is the source of wars in the contemporary era. It was imperialism which imposed two world wars upon the peoples of the planet and took 60 million lives during the first half of the century. Local wars and military conflicts have broken out in the world more than 100 times since 1945 through the fault of imperialism, primarily American.

Imperialism's socio-economic system has irreconcilable conflicts: increasing competition among the monopolies and the world's leading imperialist centers, periodically repeated economic, energy, currency and financial crises, and the intensification of conflicts between labor and capital, between the industrially developed capitalist states and the developing nations. Imperialism's internal and external conflicts, which are by nature antagonistic, are most frequently resolved in acute political struggle between classes and states. Imperialism's policy, as the concentrated expression of its economic system, compresses these conflicts and integrates them into itself, and generates wars and military conflicts. V.I. Lenin points out that "world domination" is, briefly stated, the substance of imperialist policy, of which imperialistic warfare is an extension" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 30, p. 85).

The policy of the dominant class is developed and implemented in the capitalist society by the leading bourgeois parties and their leaders, state institutions and ideologists, which ordinarily have close links with the military-industrial complex and reflect its basic interests. Ruling circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie decide whether to attempt to achieve their mercenary goals by military or other means on the basis of both the internal political situation and the balance of power in the international arena. Consequently, the policy of the most reactionary-minded circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie is the direct cause of wars in the contemporary era.

Leninist ideas about the class essence, the nature and types of wars are of great methodological importance with respect to developing in the personnel, particularly in the officer cadres, the correct concept of a possible war. This helps considerably to raise the political sophistication of the fightingmen

and helps to develop in them a sense of great responsibility for the conscientious fulfillment of their constitutional duty to reliably protect the socialist homeland.

War is a complex phenomenon of social life. Its class essence cannot be defined without thoroughly analyzing the entire aggregate of economic, social and political relations within the state or the coalition of states conducting the war. Criticizing the leaders of the Second International for their inability to explain the essence of war from a class, dialectical-materialistic standpoint, V.I. Lenin wrote the following: ".../War is simply a continuation of policy by other/ (namely forcible) /means"/. This is the formulation of Clausewitz, one of the great writers on military history issues, whose ideas originated with Hegel. And this has always been precisely the viewpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded /every/ war as a /continuation/ of the policy of the specific powers concerned--and /of various classes/ within them--at a given time" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 26, p. 224).

The bourgeoisie's ideologists attempt to describe the views of V.I. Lenin and K. Clausewitz on war as being identical. This is not consistent with the truth, however, and is nothing other than a deliberate distortion of Lenin's concept of the essence of war. K. Clausewitz interpreted policy idealistically, saw in it a manifestation of the universal interests "of the mystical spirit of a nation or state," did not understand its economic and class substance, and defined war as an extension only of foreign policy. K. Clausewitz considered war to be an eternal and inevitable companion of human society.

V.I. Lenin followed the dialectical-materialistic doctrine of the founders of Marxism for defining the essence of war, developing it as applicable to specific historical conditions. He viewed policy from an economic, class standpoint and in inseparable unity with domestic and foreign policy, with the former having the determining role. "...War is a reflection of that domestic policy," V.I. Lenin stressed, "which the specific nation pursues prior to the war" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p. 319). He demonstrated that war as a socio-political phenomenon arose with the emergence of private ownership of the tools and means of production, with society's splitup into antagonistic classes. Wars and their causes will be removed from the society's life with the elimination of private ownership, the destruction of the exploitative classes and the establishment of public ownership in most of the world's nations.

The appearance of nuclear missiles and other means of mass destruction produced in a number of bourgeois public figures and sociologists the idea that the concept of war as an extension of policy had become untenable. Contrary to these assertions, however, the profound interconnection between policy and forcible means of implementing it in a war has not lost its significance even today.

Nuclear missiles have introduced a new element into the essence of war, of course. They make it exceptionally dangerous and destructive. It is perfectly apparent, however, that war involving the use of nuclear weapons, should the imperialist aggressors succeed in unleashing one, would essentially be an extension of the criminal policy of imperialism's most aggressive, reactionary

circles. On the part of the socialist nations and all progressive forces, it would be a forced, lawful and just counteraction to imperialist aggression, which poses an unprecedented danger.

It is important to analyze the substance of the contemporary era and its conflicts to gain an understanding of the nature and the type of a possible war and consequently, of the attitude toward it of peoples of the socialist nations, of fightingmen in the army and navy, of all progressive forces.

Documents of the CPSU and of fraternal communist and workers' parties provide a scientific description of the contemporary era and analyze its conflicts. The transition from capitalism to socialism is the leading trend of our era. The conflict between socialism and imperialism is its main conflict. This conflict defines the struggle between the two opposite social systems--socialist and capitalist--and the struggle between the two main classes of the contemporary world, the working class and its allies and the imperialist bourgeoisie together with other reactionary forces. It would be incorrect to believe that this conflict itself harbors the source of the danger of war. This viewpoint serves as the justification for attempts "to divide" responsibility for the outbreak of wars and for the present danger of a world nuclear missile war "equally" between imperialism and socialism. The anticommunists and anti-Soviets proceed from that "theoretical" premise for attempting to substantiate the need for the arms race. They claim that the danger of war comes from the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist commonwealth.

We do not have to prove that socialism and imperialism differ in their social nature, that their historical prospects are different and that they therefore take different approaches to the resolution of conflicts. Socialism does not rely on resolving international conflicts by means of military force and is by principle opposed to "the export of revolution." "We say," V.I. Lenin stated, "that our goal is to achieve a socialist social arrangement which, by eliminating mankind's division into classes and all exploitation of man by man and of one nation by other nations, will inevitably eliminate any possibility of wars in general" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol. 32, p. 78).

Since the first days of the Soviet socialist state's existence it has consistently conducted a policy of peace and opposed war as a means of resolving conflicts among nations. Today, when strategic military parity has been achieved between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO bloc, the fear of retaliation is increasingly restraining the imperialist "hawks" from unleashing a new world war.

For the imperialist reactionary forces war is a means of resolving the conflicts of social reality and the main method of destroying world socialism. This is the class meaning of the bourgeois concept of the inevitability of a world war. The material, political and ideological preparations of the USA and the other NATO nations for a war were increased drastically with the arrival of the Reagan Administration in the White House. Implementing the will of the military-industrial complex, ruling aggressive circles in the United States are attempting to direct the class confrontation in the international arena into the channel of military rivalry. They are openly pursuing

a course of achieving military superiority for the USA over the USSR and for the NATO bloc over the Warsaw Pact Organization. Military outlays are increasing at an unprecedented rate, and programs for the deployment of qualitatively new strategic weapons systems are being implemented at a rapid pace.

In order to indoctrinate Soviet fightingmen in a spirit of great political vigilance and constant preparedness for the armed defense of socialism's gains, it is very important to thoroughly understand what sort of war our likely enemy is preparing for and what the responsive steps will be, should the aggressor encroach upon the security of the Soviet Nation and its allies.

Various types of wars are possible in the contemporary situation in view of the main conflict and other conflicts of the era: between the two opposite world systems or between individual capitalist states and individual socialist states (or groups of states); between antagonistic classes within a nation (civil wars); between the imperialist states and nations (peoples) engaged in a national liberation struggle; among various capitalist states (coalitions or groups of states). A combination of various types of wars is possible in the specific historical situation.

Depending upon their political objectives and their class substance, wars could be just on the part of one warring side (a war in defense of socialism's gains, wars fought to defend the independence of peoples and states, national liberation wars, and revolutionary wars conducted by workers against exploiters), and unjust on the part of the other side (imperialist wars against the socialist nations, wars fought to seize the territory of others, colonial and neocolonial wars to preserve colonialism and to divide spheres of influence, and counter-revolutionary wars by the bourgeoisie against the proletariat). Wars between different capitalist states can be unjust on both sides.

The following wars are possible as defined by their scale: a world war with the participation of most or a considerable part of the world's nations, and local wars with limited participation by two or several states. At the present time there is still a real danger of local wars developing into a world war.

Combat operations may be conducted with nuclear or conventional weapons. On the basis of this, the USA is developing and conducting maneuvers to test models of "airland operations," during which it is planned to destroy enemy targets to a great depth with high-precision weapons.

A switch from combat operations involving conventional weapons to warfare using nuclear weapons is not ruled out. Certain political and military figures in the capitalist nations are attempting to convince the world community of the possibility of "dosed" employment of nuclear weapons and thereby to substantiate the "acceptability" of a limited nuclear war. Such views are propagandized for purposes of weakening the will and solidarity of the masses in the struggle against imperialism's aggressive policy. In fact, in the praxis of international relations and military affairs there can be no effective mechanism for controlling the "limited" employment of nuclear weapons. Any attempt to employ nuclear weapons will lead to all-out, universal nuclear war.

The employment of modern means of destruction could produce a situation in which military operations will involve all continents on the planet from the very beginning. Many hundreds of millions of people will inevitably be drawn into the vortex of such a war, should imperialism unleash one. It cannot be compared to any wars of the past with respect to its ferocity or the extent of the human losses and likely devastation.

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ARMED FORCES

LEADING PERSONNEL PROFILED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian regularly publishes on page 1 articles entitled "Leading Personnel of the Army and Navy: [with individualized subheadings, e.g. "Personal Example" or "Military Innovator"] in which promising young officers are identified. Biographical details are sparse in these articles, but the officer's branch and usually one or two details of his career are reported. The following is a collection of summaries of all such articles appearing between 10 April 1985 and 9 July 1985.

ALEKSANDROV, Anatoliy Borisovich, Guards Lieutenant Colonel, is a political officer in an armored division. (4 June 1985, 175-word article by Lieutenant Colonel M. Mikhailov subtitled "Work Days of the Chief of the Division Political Department [nachpodiv]")

BALLO, Aleksandr Andreyevich, Major, Strategic Rocket forces, (18 June 1985, 175-word article by Colonel V. Polezhayev subtitled "Master")

GRISHCHENKO, Leonid Andreyevich, Lieutenant Colonel, is a commander of a detached motor vehicle repair-restoration unit in the Far East MD and a recipient of the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", third class. (9 July 1985, 175-word article by Colonel N. Fetisov subtitled By "Personal Example")

NOVOSELTSEV, Vladimir Nikolayevich, Colonel, Candidate of Engineering Sciences, is head of the department for military motor vehicle repair at the Ryazan Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School. He is credited with three inventions and dozens of innovations [ratsionalizatorskiye predlozheniya]. (28 May 1985, 200-word article by Colonel N. Kalmykov subtitled "Research Energy")

SUCHKOV, Artemiy Ivanovich, Colonel, holds a Doctorate [apparently in engineering] and is senior professor of the department for automation of the control of flying apparati at the Military Aviation Engineering Academy imeni Professor H. Ye. Zhukovskiy. Suchkov is a member of the CPSU and after 40 years of work has authored 52 inventions and is a recipient of a USSR State prize. (25 June 1985, 225-word article by Colonel M. Rebrov subtitled "Military Inventor")

YAGODINETS, G., Major, naval infantry battalion commander, recipient of the medal "For Combat Service" and the order "For Service to the Homeland in the

Armed Forces of the USSR" third class, is a graduate of the Far Eastern Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet K.K. Rokossovskiy. (30 April 1985, 200-word article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Ankov subtitled "Battalion Commander of Naval Infantry")

ZAPOROZHAN, Igor, Guards Senior Lieutenant, awarded title "Hero of the Soviet Union" for service in Afghanistan, is currently serving in the Central Asian Military District. (10 April 1985, 125-word article by Major V. Kosaryev subtitled "Grandson of a Front-line Soldier")

Three of the articles, those on Grishchenko, Suchkov and Novoseltsev, emphasize these officers' contribution to scientific-technical progress and innovation.

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ARMED FORCES

#### BRIEFS

MILITARY CHIEFS SIGN I.F. SANKO OBITUARY--Colonel General Ivan Fedoseyevich Sanko, retired, veteran of the Soviet Armed Forces, participant in the Great Patriotic War, and Hero of the Soviet Union, has died after a serious and prolonged illness. In the postwar period he was a corps commander, deputy, then commander of artillery in the Moscow and Voronezh Military Districts and the Northern Group of Forces and chief of a faculty at the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Artillery Engineering Academy, and from 1961 through 1969 he worked in a responsible post in the directorate of the commander of rocket troops and artillery of the Ground Forces. He was invariably noted for his party principles, sense of responsibility for the task in hand, exactingness toward himself and his subordinates, and sensitivity and attentiveness toward people. V.I. Petrov, YE.F. Ivanovskiy, M.D. Popkov, A.M. Mayorov, D.A. Grinkevich, V.A. Merimsky, P.I. Bazhenov, V.M. Mikhalkin, YU.M. Andrianov, S.KH. Aganov, YU.M. Potapov, V.K. Pikalov, G.YE. Peredel'skiy, K.P. Kazakov, YE.M. Komarov, V.A. Grishantsov, V.M. Bobrov, A.P. Lebedev. [Obituary of I.F. Sanko] [Excerpts] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 85 Second Edition p 4 PM]

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## NAVAL FORCES

### ADMIRAL SERGEI GORSHKOV'S INTERVIEW

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English Vol XXI No 139, 17 Jul 85

[Text] "The United States and NATO have turned the world's oceans into a staging area for unleashing aggression against the USSR and other socialist countries," Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, said in an interview with the Moscow-based magazine Ogonyok.

All American military doctrines over the post-war period have been underlied by a desire to ensure the US global naval superiority, he said. The trend has become still more manifest now that the Reagan administration has proclaimed virtually all most important ocean areas and the adjacent territories of many sovereign states to be 'zones of US vital interests'.

President Reagan has been publicly urging the US Navy to clinch the lead and military supremacy to gain access to all the world's oceans and control the air space over them as well as the oceanic surface and depths, while his Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, has been busy advocating the idea of blocking the Soviet Navy at its bases in the area of Kamchatka and off the Kola Peninsula and turning the Soviet Union into an isolated island to enable the United States to control the rest of the world. With these aims in mind, the United States and NATO have been stepping up the arms race, including the race in naval weapons systems.

"With the formation of the NATO military bloc uniting countries with powerful Navies," Admiral Gorshkov went on to say, "our former allies have begun preparations for another world war. As they have converted vast ocean areas into nuclear-missile launching sites, the threat to the security of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community from the oceans has grown, compelling us to bolster our defenses to counter threats not only from land but also from the sea. An effort has been launched to reinforce the Soviet ocean-going Navy. Priority has been given to developing submarine and air forces. With minimum possible money and time inputs, we have been able to catch up with the US strategic naval capability."

"Our Navy is equipped with top-grade military hardware, and its ships meet all the requirements of effectively fulfilling combat tasks in the oceans in the event of an imperialist attack on our homeland," Admiral Gorshkov said. "The potential aggressors know this and have to reckon with the combat power of the Soviet Navy."

## NAVAL FORCES

### DEVELOPING INDEPENDENCE, INITIATIVE AMONG JUNIOR OFFICERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 85 (signed to press 5 Mar 85) pp 63-68

[Article by Rear Admiral A. Pushkin, candidate of naval sciences: "A Lieutenant's Time of Maturation"]

[Text] After a routine surfacing of the submarine, Sr Lt O. Kirichenko went on watch. An hour later the commander ordered that the depth of submersion be increased. Kirichenko alerted the watch mechanic and gave the appropriate command to the horizontal rudders control post.

As the indicated depth was neared, a hiss of water turned into a cloud of vapor by high pressure was heard entering the compartment. The watch officer took stock instantaneously.

"Emergency alarm! Full speed ahead! Come to depth...trim 10 degrees aft!" One after another his precise orders followed.

The alarm signal always prompts the sailors to act without delay. In a few seconds the men occupied their places in battle stations and the submarine came to the indicated depth. The closed Kingston Valve halted the influx of water. As it turned out later, a foreign object fell under the Kingston Valve due to the inefficiency of a young sailor. Owing to the efficient and well-coordinated actions of the watch officer and watch mechanic, the entire submarine crew continued its journey and later on successfully fulfilled its assigned mission.

It is difficult for the uninitiated to imagine that months of persistent and meticulous training of the sailors, including the watch officer, lie behind the few seconds of able and efficient actions.

It is well known that the ship commander is responsible for preparing the officers to stand underway watch. When Lt Kirichenko, a graduate of a higher naval school, arrived on the submarine, the commander took pains to become well acquainted with him and did everything so that the young officer would immediately feel that they were glad to see him and had awaited his arrival. The captain 2d rank familiarized the newly arrived officer with the tasks and

life of the crew, and personally acquainted him with all the officers, as well as with the petty officers and sailors of the element which the lieutenant was to lead.

Thus the senior comrade displayed considerate attention toward the junior, which is so important at the start of service. The commander talked specifically about Kirichenko with the submarine's party organization secretary, giving suggestions on how to involve the young officer in the social life of the crew. And this is also not unimportant.

As for the lieutenant's professional training, the commander placed it under his personal control, taught Kirichenko a great deal himself and was always well informed about all of his duty performance. The young officer passed his examinations on time for independent control of his section and to be allowed to stand underway watch. He displayed a strong will, initiative and quick reaction to changes in the situation, and the commander tried in every way to develop these qualities in his subordinate. With the help of his senior comrade, the party organization and the whole collective, Kirichenko became an able department commander and one of the best watch officers.

Modern submarines and their equipment and weapons are highly complex systems, developed on the basis of the achievements of Soviet science and technology. They demand from the officers broad military and technical knowledge and good practical training, without which it is impossible to achieve high combat readiness. Moreover, the more complex the military equipment and the more powerful the weapon, the more thoroughly it is necessary to know them, for even small errors committed at sea can have fatal consequences.

Recalling this, many commanders strive to teach young officers personally during sea and ocean voyages, where frequently difficulties arise unexpectedly which demand rapid, initiative-filled and correct actions. This is precisely how officer O. Faleyev operates. On each voyage he gives exercise situation inputs from his station on the bridge or the central control compartment to department commanders and the watch officer, giving them the opportunity to make and execute decisions independently, and then gives a careful critique in the presence of all the officers.

This method makes it possible not only to uncover errors, but also to imbue the officers with effective and decisive decisionmaking skills. It is fully understood that it is not possible to make recommendations for all instances in life which may arise. And the point here is not only for the lieutenant to master his official duties quickly, but also that he obtain a psychological fund which will encourage him to meet difficulties boldly, set about to master equipment without doubts and act decisively in the complex situations of a voyage. The closer the commander is to the young officers, the easier it is for him to caution them against various errors in their work.

Nevertheless, frequently one lieutenant or another does something incorrectly or not entirely correctly. And this is understandable. One who is just beginning his service has to do a great many things for the first time in his life. Commanders are often confronted with the question of how to react to mistakes and omissions by subordinates who are taking their first steps on the

ship. No standard "recipe" will be given here -- there are different kinds of mistakes. The important thing is to display attention and sensitivity.

As a young officer I served on a submarine under a competent and strict commander. On the one hand his demandingness encouraged us to work to the best of our abilities and taught us to be responsive. But on the other hand, his inaccessibility and the method of indoctrination which he chose -- to keep lieutenants at a distance and hold frequent "pep talks" for them, depressed and unsettled us. Frankly, my fellow lieutenants and I not only threw up our hands at times, but a bitter disappointment in military service also crept into our hearts.

It is hard to say how this may have turned out if the deputy ship's commander for political affairs and commanders of the combat departments had not given us moral support at these moments. And in time we all had the happy experience of also serving under attentive and sensitive commanders. Even the former commander's "lessons" had their effect. We became convinced from our own experience that supervisors who are more inclined to "scold" lieutenants for their mistakes than to teach how not to repeat them are themselves making a big mistake. And, of course, we tried not to make this mistake when we became commanders ourselves.

Any officer arriving on a ship experiences difficulties. The transition from the system of training in school, well-polished through the years, to independent work where it is necessary from the first steps to make decisions on the most varied problems, and where it is necessary oneself to study the ship and its management, pass examinations and at the same time teach and indoctrinate the men, is the most difficult in my view. And at times it happens that a young officer in the time allotted to him does not succeed in preparing for and passing the exams to be allowed to manage his section independently. In any case, many school graduates have an inadequate ability to organize their work properly.

It is well known that professional service and social matters heap so many duties on a young officer that with the slightest disorganization there is not enough time. And in this environment he begins to become consumed by frantic, salutary activity. Here it is the duty of senior comrades who have already served some time on the ship to recommend to the new officer how better to organize his workday and how to select the most important of all his activities and bring it to a conclusion. In this period the help and support of superiors and party and komsomol organizations are especially necessary to the young officer. I want to be correctly understood: I am far from the thought that school graduates need oversupervision in trivial matters. To the contrary, they must be disciplined to be independent and be trusted more from their first steps.

When Lieutenant V. Dmitriyev arrived on the submarine his senior comrades prompted him on what he needed to do in order to assimilate more quickly the duties of a missile group commander and become a watch officer. Feeling that he was needed on the ship and that they trusted and were always ready to help him, the young officer fervently set about his business and in the established time period was permitted to exercise independent control of his section and

to stand underway watch. Having become convinced that Dmitriyev was managing his duties, the commander entrusted the whole department to him while missile firing was being worked out. Recognizing the responsibility which this trust placed upon him, Dmitriyev prepared well to accomplish the difficult mission and did so in an excellent manner.

The commander's attention, the system of specific and scheduled tasks and the monitoring of each routine critique all played a role in the lieutenant's maturation. This made it possible to establish in a timely manner the areas in which the officer was falling short and what types and in what areas he required help.

In speaking about specialist training, I would like to emphasize that the school graduates an engineer-operator, and therefore the navy is always sure of the readiness and ability of a young officer quickly to obtain the right to independent control of his section. Of course, this presumes that he receives help from his senior comrades. However, the ship's commander, no matter how experienced, cannot today manage the training of lieutenants without the daily support of staff officers, for he cannot thoroughly know all specialties. Unfortunately, thus far some staff officer specialists erroneously believe that their main function is to monitor the course of training and the condition of equipment. The notebook in which they jot down shortcomings uncovered during inspections to be reported to the senior commander is of special help to such comrades. But who better than the staff missile, machinery or navigation specialist officer can learn what gaps a lieutenant has in his knowledge, help him on site and give sensible advice? That is, I am talking about the style of work of the staff officers, who are communists as a rule. This means that here is a sphere where the headquarters party organization can have a substantial impact.

Let us say that well equipped tactical study rooms are of great importance for training school graduates as specialists and watch officers. In the squadron where officer Ye. Chernov serves, staff specialists created such a study room. There one can learn, not only in a theoretical but also in a practical way, how to fulfill the duties of a submarine watch officer underway, and can acquire skills in the use of weapons and equipment. Simulators, technical teaching machines and sample documents facilitate high quality training on what is required of an officer at sea.

Navy practice convinces us that while daily improving the knowledge and skills of lieutenants it is necessary to give them greater initiative and independence and to place them in situations which demand vigilance, presence of mind and self-control. And it is still very important to support the officer in a timely manner, especially in difficult situations. The attention given to him by a sensitive commander grown wise with experience, or a staff specialist, plays a great, I would say, decisive role here.

I recall that when I was a young lieutenant, during a torpedo attack, I reported certain elements of the target's movement which substantially differed from those worked out by the automatic torpedo firing device. But I had only to see the surprise on the face of the staff officer present in the central control post for doubts to creep into my mind: Did I make a mistake?

Would it not be better to give information corresponding to that worked out by the instruments? However, each time I placed the bearings on the firing board, each time I obtained a differing target course and speed. I timidly gave my next report to the commander. The hand on the stop-watch quickly moved around the dial. Only a few seconds were left until the command, "Fire!" How could it be? The senior assistant looked at me reassuringly as if to say, "Don't be bashful, Lieutenant." This was enough to remove my vacillations. The commander confirmed my target data and attacked accordingly. After the torpedo firing the submarine surfaced. The target was destroyed. As it became clear later, the automatic torpedo firing device was not calibrated and thus gave inexact data. The commander thanked me. Is it necessary to say how this inspired me and summoned within me a desire to give myself fully to the service?

I would particularly like to discuss the need to develop persistently the initiative and skills of young officers in such an important area of commander's activity as political and military indoctrination of subordinates. You see, it is precisely here that passivity and poor preparation of lieutenants, and their lack of understanding of their role and tasks, are most often manifested. It is natural for a commander to be most concerned about the professional training of young officers, their study of the ship's systems and main guidance documents. But a section is first of all people, sailors and petty officers, on whom both combat readiness and victory in battle depend. To what extent has the young officer gotten to know those on whom he expects to rely, and learned how he plans to lead his subordinates? It seems to me that these questions must interest the ship's deputy commander for political affairs and the party and komsomol organizations. Both timely assistance in their decisions and support of their initiatives and pedagogical techniques are very important to lieutenants.

I will cite this example. Having arrived for further service on a submarine, Lieutenant L. Kolomiychenko decided to acquaint himself with the personal affairs of his subordinates before beginning to talk with them. And already during their first meeting the sailors understood that their new commander knew a lot about them.

"In which children's home were you raised?" the lieutenant asked Seaman A. Morgun.

"In Novosibirsk," he answered with surprise.

And already the fact alone that the officer knew certain biographical information about the sailors somehow immediately won the men over to him. All felt that the young officer was not indifferent to their past lives.

A few days later, when preparing for patrol service, Kolomiychenko saw Seaman S. Krymov tie a petty officer's armband. The petty officer said a curt "Thanks," looked carefully at the well-tied armband on his arm, walked away and silently watched as Krymov tried all by himself to tie up his braid. The seaman clearly felt uncomfortable about asking the petty officer to help him.



"Let me help," suddenly offered the lieutenant and, before the sailor could say anything in reply, he quickly tied up the braid. The petty officer was embarrassed to look the officer in the eye.

It was a seemingly unimportant incident, but it did not escape the attention of his subordinates. And it was no accident that the next morning the sailors talked about it in the crew's quarters.

Nor did the lieutenant's actions stay unnoticed by the ship political officer. In a talk with the young officers he noted Kolomiychenko as a man who thought about the example set by his actions.

Involving the young officers in indoctrination presumes granting them independence and developing their responsibility for the state of affairs in the groups and departments entrusted to them. Excessive supervision and the fact that ships' commanders still frequently take on problems which should be those of small unit commanders, naturally, in no way facilitate this. Also, some senior commanders at times encourage such oversupervision.

Take disciplinary practice, for example. Let us say that a patrol arrested a sailor for disorderly conduct in town. It is a serious offense, but not so serious as to be beyond the authority of the department commander. However, sometimes the sailor's immediate supervisor may be thought of only later, in order to punish him along with his subordinate. And the ship commander, his deputy for political affairs and sometimes even the task force commander initiate the examination of the misdeed and talk with the guilty party. They waste a lot of time on this. The lieutenant thinks that since the senior commanders have taken steps there is no need for him to become involved with his subordinate, although it is namely he who should have done so in the first place. I believe that those supervisors are right who entrust small unit commanders to deal with derelict subordinates and require a report from them, thus accustoming them to exercising their disciplinary authorities.

Today such officers' qualities as initiative, independence, commander's will and organizational ability have grown immeasurably in importance. The fluidity of modern combat and the need to operate partly in isolated ships' compartments, separated from senior commanders, inescapably demand independent decisions from an officer, and the complex conditions under which combat operations are conducted and the possibility that critical situations may arise demand an ability to organize people and subordinate them to one's will and to direct their efforts toward fulfillment of the combat mission in any difficult situation.

Navy practice indicates undeniably that missions are better solved and discipline is stronger on ships where commanders grant the young officers the opportunity to display independence and initiative in the course of combat training, seek their active participation in the indoctrination process, train them to influence people through a system of measures which takes into account the individuality of each subordinate, and allow them to master the art of working on their own. For example, this is precisely how matters are handled on the submarines where officers V. Kotlyarov and A. Mamontov are serving.



The fact that on these ships political officers and the party and komsomol organizations are concerned about the development of young officers also has its impact. They constantly hold each lieutenant in their field of vision, are involved in the training process and the practice of indoctrination, offer support in difficult moments and guard them against errors in a timely manner. On instructions from the party buro and komsomol committees, the most experienced officer-communists and komsomol members help young small unit commanders to learn their weapons and equipment and master pedagogical and methodological skill. Involving lieutenants in active social life and party political work also plays an essential role. As leaders of political study groups and members of agitprop groups, komsomol committees and editorial boards of radio and wall newspapers, they grow in an ideological-theoretical sense and acquire skills in conducting indoctrination work, which reflects positively on the officers' discipline and professional duties.

But here I would like to say something. Everything is good in moderation. It happens that a conscious, initiative-filled officer is burdened with many assignments. He is, as the saying goes, a jack of all trades. His energies are scattered, and of course neither social nor professional duties win. Nor does that lieutenant win who stands aside from the social life of the crew. True, here there is something for political officers and party and komsomol activists to think about.

We have touched upon only some aspects of the military maturation of young officers at the start of their shipboard duty. As a rule lieutenants arriving in the fleet have good theoretical military training and all are distinguished by high political consciousness and a desire to fulfill their difficult military duty in the best possible way. All they are lacking are practical experience in carrying out their service and in training and indoctrinating subordinates, and pedagogical skill. This is why concern about the development of young officers as commanders is an important and vital task for all commanders, political officers and party and komsomol organizations. On the ships and in the units there exist all the conditions and opportunities necessary to arm lieutenants with required knowledge and skills and to transmit to them everything which is most valuable that has been acquired in the pedagogical and methodological arsenal of the best commanders, and in the practice of training submariners for modern combat.

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## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### UZBEK KOMSOMOL PAPER HIGHLIGHTS POLITICAL OFFICER CAREER

Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 26 Apr 85 p 4

["Guardians of the Press" passages between slantlines in boldface in original]

[Text] /More Powerful Than Arms

Today in various corners of our limitless country youths who are about to bind themselves to an officer's career are carefully preparing for the exams of the new school. The work of selecting worthy candidates for military uchilishcha is busily continuing in military units, general education schools and vocational-technical schools, in military commissariats, and in Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations. Many letters are arriving from various cities and villages of our republic in which youths request materials with detailed information about our country's military uchilishcha and rules of admission into them. Today, in response to newspaper readers' request, we offer for your attention an article about our country's higher political military uchilishcha./

In speaking about the formation of the worker-peasant Red Army in 1918 when the young Soviet government was threatened, the great leader of the proletariat V. I. Lenin said that commanders should be selected only from among the people. He said that only Red officers would be able to win authority among soldiers and be able to strengthen socialism in our army.

The words of the great leader are reflected today. The Soviet Army, which demonstrated to the whole world in the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars that it was the strongest, today has become the firm shield of the world's peace-loving forces.

Over the past years, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have carried out very great work in organizing educational institutions to prepare military specialists and in creating sufficient educational bases.

Future officers today are being trained in uchilishcha under the USSR Ministry of Defense. Commanders, and political and engineering cadre are mastering the secrets of military science in four years in higher military uchilishcha.

Candidates for military uchilishcha are chosen primarily from soldiers, sergeants, sailors, warrant officers, Surovets (graduates of Suvorov Military

School) and Nakhimovites (graduates of Nakhimov Naval School), as well as from schools and vocational-technical schools. Those who successfully complete uchilishcha receive a higher military education diploma.

As is known, military uchilishcha, like all higher educational institutions, admit [pupils] who have mastered subjects with good and excellent grades, and who are physically strong and healthy. Those who successfully pass the exams receive a full diploma [tola ma"lumot] in general political subjects, and technical and special subjects.

Officer careers, as civilian vocations, are also divided according to various specialties. One of the most important among them is political worker. This is because the political worker is considered the political leader who inculcates army soldiers with profound consciousness and the spirit of loyalty to our party, government, and bravery of past generations, and calls them to heroism. Because of this, officers who have completed higher military political schools are frequently likened to teachers.

Indeed, the political worker is considered the person closest to the army soldier. This is because he pays attention to things ranging from the letters the soldier writes home, to cultural rest, political conviction, and what kind of books he reads. In short, he is considered the spiritual father of the soldier's service.

Below we provide the addresses of our country's military political schools and the conditions of entrance to them for young men wanting to master such a difficult but honorable profession.

/Donetsk Higher Military Political School of Engineering and Communications Troops (Donetsk city, 340090)

Kiev Higher Military Naval-Political School (Kiev city, 252145)

Kurgan Higher Military-Political Aviation School (Kurgan city, 640025)

Leningrad Air Defense Higher Military-Political School (Leningrad city, 198324)

Lvov Higher Military-Political School (Lvov city 290028)

Novosibirsk Higher Ground Forces Military-Political School imeni 60 Years of Great October (Novosibirsk city, 630103)

Riga Higher Military-Political School, imeni Marshal S. S. Biryuzov (Riga city, 226028)

Sverdlovsk Higher Tank-Artillery Military-Political School (Sverdlovsk city, 620108)

Simferopol Higher Construction Military-Political School (Simferopol city, 333037)

These schools prepare officer cadre with a higher military-political education to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR. (The Lvov city school prepares military journalists and specialists on cultural-enlightenment affairs with a higher military-political education.)

The course of study is 4 years.

Those entering higher military-political schools, as well as those entering Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance school take written exams in Russian language and literature (for those entering Lvov Higher Military-Political school an oral Russian language and literature replaces mathematics), and oral exams in geography and history of the USSR./

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## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### CHEMICAL DEFENSE AND ENGINEERING CORPS OFFICER CAREERS FEATURED

Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 16 May 85 p 3

["Guardians of Peace (Part) II: Our Army's Shock Force"]

[Text] The engineering corps are considered the shock force of our Armed Forces. As is known, in today's era of developed science and technology, all troops have the latest and most developed weapons. The deployment and use of such technology is accomplished through implementation of quite complex engineering solutions. Therefore it's clear that our army requires mature military specialists.

The chemical defense forces likewise have a special place in our Armed Forces. Today many countries of the world, especially imperialist countries who are arming themselves more every day, are producing many chemical and bacteriologic-al weapons.

The work carried out by military specialists who are being prepared in chemical defense has great significance in the civil defense of our country.

In short, becoming an artillery force, rocket force, or chemical defense force officer means not just becoming a military person, but a specialist in one's field with a higher education. Therefore, those who wish to begin studies in uchilishcha must not only want to become officers, but have a mastery of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and other exact sciences.

Today we tell about our country's engineering-command, military engineering, and chemical defense schools, their addresses, and entrance exams.

The period of study in these uchilishcha is basically 4 years. Those who graduate receive the rank of lieutenant and a diploma in military engineering.

Below we provide the addresses of the schools.

Perm Higher Military Engineering-Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov (Perm city, 614015)

Rostov Higher Military Command School imeni Artillery Chief Marshal M. I. Nedelin (Rostov na Donu city, 244027)

Saratov Higher Military Command School Order of the Red Banner imeni Hero of the Soviet Union, Bearer of the Red Star Major-General A. I. Lizyukov (Saratov city 410082)

Serpukhov Rocket Forces Higher Military Engineer-Commander School imeni Lenin Komsomol (Serpukhov city, 142202)

Kharkov Higher Military Engineer-Commander School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union N. I. Krylov (Kharkov city 310056) Period of study 5 years

Leningrad Higher Military and Topography Command School Order of the Red Banner imeni Bearer of the Red Star Army General A. I. Antonov (Leningrad city, 197047)

Kazan Higher Military Engineering School imeni Artillery Marshal M. M. Chistyakov (Kazan city, 420025)

Kaliningrad Higher Engineering Forces School Order of Lenin and the Red Banner, imeni A. A. Zhdanov (Kaliningrad city 236022) Period of study 5 years

Kamenets-Podol'sk Higher Military Engineer-Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Forces V. N. Kharchenko (Khmel'nitskaya Oblast, Kamenets-Podol'sk city, 281900)

Tyumen Higher Military Engineer-Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Forces A. A. Proshlyakov (Tyumen city, 625028)

Kostroma Higher Military Chemical Defense School (Kostroma city, 156015)

Saratov Higher Military-Chemical Defense Engineers School (Saratov city, 410037)

Tambov Higher Military-Chemical Defense Command School Order of the Red Banner (Tambov city, 922011)

Those wanting to enter the above schools take written exams in Russian language and literature, and oral exams in mathematics, physics, and history of the USSR. Those entering chemical defense higher military schools take oral exams in chemistry instead of physics.

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## MILITARY-EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### MILITARY CADET URGED TO STUDY RUSSIAN HARDER

Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 26 Apr 85 p 4

["First Step Towards His Wish"]

[Text] Inomjon was beside himself with gladness for successfully completing the entrance exams. Today this city which is considered one of Russia's old cities is not alien to him. Now he has been living 4 years in this city.

During the day he walked all over the city. The next morning his military life would begin. Walking around the streets of the city he proudly looked at his military uniform.

At dawn the command "Rise" was given. In a short time the cadets were lined up in the school yard. The company commander, Captain Usenko, congratulated the cadets on the first day of their fighting lives in the USSR Armed Forces. Then physical training exercises began.

Inomjon ate his breakfast that morning with a great appetite. He was also very alert in class. In order to remember as much as possible of the subject covered, he made notes after class.

Thus began his military life. Studies here were just like in a military unit. It was necessary to observe the statutes unswervingly and to read belles-lettres and the daily press in addition to the material for class.

To tell the truth, the order of the day at the military school was not much to Inomjon's liking at first. After all, it was non-stop activity all day. Lesson after lesson. Periods on duty. From time to time alert drills...

But soon he became used to this kind of life. He not just became used to it, but could not imagine any other kind of life. Soon he became stronger, began to feel more hardy and alert, and his body began to fill his uniform.

The year he finished the first course, the company commander Captain Usenko called Inomjon aside.

"I am pleased with your efforts. If you continue this way, you'll make a good officer and political worker. I congratulate you on entering the second course."

Inomjon said, "Thank you, captain."

"Only spend more time studying Russian. Read more belles-lettres. The kind which has woven into it the human soul (?odamlar qalbini organ). After all, soon you'll be a leader to soldiers," said the captain, patting him on the shoulder.

"OK, comrade captain!" said Inomjon gladly.

Inomjon Toychiyev is now getting grades of "good" studying at Sverdlovsk Higher Political Tank-Artillery School imeni L. I. Brezhnev.

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## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### DISCUSSIONS PROMOTE OFFICER CAREERS

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 4 May 85 carries on p 3 a 50 word article titled "Discussions Begin." The article reports on discussions dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the World War II victory which have begun in the Komsomol organizations of Mirzachol. These discussions are dedicated to the topic "We Are Always Prepared to Defend the Soviet Homeland." "Along with other measures, the discussions help raise young people's interest in military professions."

### PREPARATION PAYS OFF FOR ASPIRING OFFICER

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 16 May 85 carries on p 5 a 300 word article titled "The Aspiration." The article tells of Shahobiddin Pardayev's successful attempt to enter a military school. From his childhood, Shahobiddin was interested in books and films about the military. In his last year of secondary school his military training teacher advised him to go to the Ahangaranskiy Rayon Komsomol committee. Those in the committee saw the youth's aspiration and counseled him appropriately. Shahobiddin studied hard and tempered himself physically for entrance into a military school. After graduation from secondary school he applied to Serpukhovo Rocket Forces Higher Military Engineering-Command School imeni Lenin Komsomol. He passed the exams with "excellent" and "good" marks. Now Shahobiddin is successfully completing his first year of studies at that school.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

INCREASED FRG MILITARY EXPENDITURES CRITICIZED

LD262108 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 26 Jul 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] The militarist preparations continue, not only in the United States, where the Congressional conference committee has approved the Pentagon's record budget for fiscal 1986--\$302 billion, but also in Japan where the leadership decided to abolish the restriction on military spending of 1 percent of the GNP. The FRG, likewise, recently has been a source of especially numerous reports on major military appropriations for the West German Army--from large consignments of uniforms to a new type of combat aircraft. I am asking Aleksandr Zholkver, our political observer, to comment upon these latter reports.

[begin recording] Indeed, one cannot fail to pay attention to the present wave of acquisitions for the Bundeswehr. Literally everything is being purchased. Woerner, the head of the West German military department, just declared that 300,000 units of warm underwear had been purchased for his warriors, and that he himself wanted to try it in Arctic areas of Canada. Naturally, one can muse over this purchase, taking into account that the climate in the FRG is itself far from being Arctic. It can make someone reminiscent of how at one time, warm clothes were collected in Germany for the Hitlerite Wehrmacht, when its soldiers were freezing around Moscow and Stalingrad. But I would not like to engage in similar comparisons, especially because the recent celebration of the 40th anniversary of the crushing defeat of fascism has convincingly proved what the outcome of hikes over the snowy expanses for Germany was.

I would like to draw your attention to something else. In whose interests does the above-mentioned minister Woerner spend the money of the West German taxpayers? These are huge sums of money. The FRG budget for the next year plans to spend over DM50 billion for military appropriations. Recent reports show in an especially graphic way what this money is going to be spent for. For example, the financial balance reports of the two major aviation concerns in the FRG--Messerschmitt and Dornier--have just been published. A propos, our listeners of the older generation certainly remember these names. Messerschmitt and Dornier were delivering aircraft for the Hitlerite air force, which among other things, terrorized our sky

in the years during the past war. Now both concerns are doing their old business--producing military aircraft. In doing so, they again obtain tremendous profits. The turnover of the Messerschmitt exceeded DM5 billion last year. Dornier likewise indicates some positive development in its financial report. However, all this is not surprising, taking into account the cost of the death-dealing products they produce. One Tornado military aircraft costs DM105 million. The Bundeswehr has bought 160 of them. Multiply these figures, and you will get an impression of the sums the West German aviation concerns control. They anticipate even greater profits laying ahead of them.

Plans for producing the so-called aircraft of the 90s are being widely discussed now in Bonn. In this connection, the West German press writes about a forthcoming military order of about DM80-100 billion. One can only guess how this will boost profits of the above-mentioned Messerschmitt and Dornier. These are exactly those in whose interests military appropriations in the FRG are being stepped up. And the 300,000 warm underpants, as we can see, is far from being the largest article of these generous spendings.

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AFGHANISTAN

U.S. MISSILES FOR PAKISTAN INTENDED FOR AFGHAN REBELS

BK241209 Moscow In Urdu to Pakistan 1100 GMT 23 Jul 85

[Aleksandr Korolev Commentary]

[Text] Recently, the U.S. State Department announced that Washington has decided to supply a large consignment of Sidewinder and 100 portable Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Pakistan. These two kinds of missiles will be supplied very expeditiously. But what is the reason for this haste? The U.S. State Department representatives, especially the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Deane Hinton, say Pakistan's defense capability needs to be strengthened. At the same time, they also make provocative statements that Afghanistan poses a threat to Pakistan. But certain reports published in the American press make it clear that all these arguments forwarded by the U.S. State Department are a mere game of words in a bid to cover the reason for the supply of these military missiles.

There are also ample reasons to understand why the United States wants to conceal who will receive these dangerous supplies. Who are they, actually? It would not be out of place to mention in this regard the report published by the American newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES. The paper has clearly indicated that the Stinger missiles will be provided to Pakistan for those enemy groups that are waging a war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and as far as Islamabad is concerned it will play the role of a mere agent in this regard. The newspaper has noted in this context the concern expressed by a number of American Congressmen over the sale of portable Stinger missiles to Pakistan and other countries. The Stinger missiles are said to have been made in a way that they can be fired from a man's shoulder. THE NEW YORK TIMES says these portable missiles are considered to be the best weapons for those terrorists who try to shoot down passenger planes. As is already known, the hired terrorists in Afghanistan, who are regarded by some people as the holy warriors of Islam, keep on indulging in such criminal activities. It was only these holy warriors of Islam who fired on an Afghan DC-10 passenger plane while it was on a return flight from Saudi Arabia to Kabul carrying Afghan haj pilgrims after their pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina last autumn. The enemy missiles, which caused considerable damage to the plane and endangered the lives of a number of Hajis, were supplied by the United States. Now the Washington administration,

which has adopted the line of a terrorist-waged war against Afghanistan, has decided to immediately supply one more consignment of Stinger missiles to Pakistan. These are the missiles which, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, are considered to be exemplary weapons for terrorists.

Another feature of this new deal for the supply of Stinger missiles to Pakistan is that the U.S. State Department has fixed their price at \$8.5 million so as to avoid the need for congressional approval of the deal, keeping in view the concern expressed by a number of U.S. congressmen over the supply of these exemplary weapons for terrorists in other countries. According to law, the only deals required to be approved by the Congress are those whose amount exceeds \$14 million. In fact, when any question of preparation for new terrorist activities against revolutionary Afghanistan arises, the Washington administration becomes ready to play various kinds of tricks.

CSO: 4656/147

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-050  
29 August 1985

MOSCOW TV REPORTS STEADY GROWTH OF AFGHAN PARTY

LD041654 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 4 Jul 85

[Video report from correspondent in Afghanistan Mikhail Leshchinskiy -- recorded: from the "Vremye" newscast]

[Text] [Video shows ruins of small building, other buildings with damaged facades] This house was blown up by bandits in the very center of Mazar-e-Sharif, one of the most ancient and beautiful towns of Central Asia. Tens of peaceful citizens died or were seriously wounded as a result, including old people, women, and children. This, however, is not all that shook the town's residents. The explosion occurred very close to the famous mosque. [Video shows building decorated with mosaic tiles]

Under the cover of religious slogans, hired killers are waging a struggle against their own people and the religion they respect. Withstanding and being victorious in this undeclared war imposed on Afghanistan is the most important task of the current stage of the national-democratic revolution. The social base of the new power is steadfastly expanding. The ranks of the party's members are growing, with more than half the increase being craftsmen, small traders, the intelligentsia, and religious figures. The role of these strata of the population is also increasing in the organs of local self-government. [Video shows people in street, market stall]

I would like to introduce (Abdol Jamil Zarifi). [Video shows Leshchinskiy and Zarifi on broad path leading to mosque in distance] He is well-known in Afghanistan as a religious figure, and, at the same time, he is a member of the PDPA. Quite recently he was appointed governor of Balkh Province, one of the biggest provinces of the country, in the north. [Zafiri speaking in Dari with superimposed Russian translation] At the current stage of the April Revolution, the party is doing all it can for the prosperity of Muslim working people and for the progress of the people. People's power respects religious feelings, and the fact that I am a governor confirms this. Our task now is to tell the people, who support the revolution and must do everything it can for its victory, about all this.

CSO: 1801/276

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-050  
29 August 1985

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA CLAIMS DUSHMAN ATROCITIES IN DRA

PM091447 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 85 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Skrizhalin "Dispatch from Afghanistan": "Dushmans' New Victims"--First two paragraphs are editorial instruction]

[Text] Recently our press reported a provocative falsehood concocted by the West German ARD television channel. In one of its programs it "informed" FRG viewers of "atrocities" allegedly perpetrated by Soviet and Afghan troops on DRA territory. Without bothering to find out the real facts about the situation in the republic, the program's organizers fabricated "photographic evidence" of "victims" among Afghanistan's population, for which they say the "Russians" are responsible.

Indeed, the true facts mean nothing to the provocateurs. These facts graphically show who is bringing death and sufferings to the Afghan people and at whose bidding. There are numerous such pieces of evidence and here is one of them. Our correspondent in the DRA describes the dushmans' latest bloody crime against the people of Afghanistan.

Panjsher. A mountainous region of Afghanistan. Until recently, the counterrevolution regarded it as its own domain. The rebel leader (Akhmad Shakh) formed his gangs there. The dushmans carried out combat training there and rested there following bloody raids. The peasants of the Panjsher, extortionately taxed and under pain of death, were forced to feed the bandits. Stocks of precious and semiprecious stones--emeralds and lazurite--seized by (Akhmad Shakh) and sent to Pakistan, ensured him "most-favored status" in the provision of modern weapons.

However, the rebels' "prosperity" has come to an end. Under the attacks of the Afghan forces, the counterrevolutionaries were forced to retreat into almost inaccessible gorges. (Ahmad Shakh) was counting on sitting it out there until better times. In one such gorge, near the village of (Dekhmikini), the dushmans established a base.

The attack was unexpected. The dushmans, who at first resisted stubbornly, preferred to escape and flee under threat of being surrounded. They abandoned weapons, ammunition, powerful communications apparatus (apparently it was intended to establish a radio center there), equipment, and food.

The trophies were impressive, but they were of secondary interest when the servicemen saw the base's main "sight"--an underground prison.

On examining this sinister structure, somebody remarked: "a tiger pit." And indeed it was an enlarged copy of those same "tiger pits" in which Vietnamese patriots languished during the U.S. aggression in Indochina. Well, the resemblance is only natural: The aggression against Afghanistan is being directed from the same "command center"--Washington.

The Panjsher prison was a huge cellar divided into three compartments. There were traces of caked blood everywhere. On the floor there were numerous instruments of torture: wire lashes with lead tips, sharp sticks, chains, shackles, blocks, hooks, and pincers. In addition to home-made pincers, there were nickel-plated ones of Italian manufacture. The inquisitors had found a more "fitting" use, in their opinion, for this medical instrument.

It is difficult to imagine how these underground bunkers could accommodate 127 prisoners, whose bodies were later thrown by the dushmans into the rapid mountain river (Mikini). Three captured dushmans testified that (Akhmad Shah) had come to the base 2 weeks before the villainous massacre. And he had ordered the prisoners to be killed in the event of attack. His subordinates started to execute the ringleader's order immediately. It was a real bloodbath. They carved the prisoners' backs with straps, put out their eyes, and cut off noses and ears. Delighting in the prisoners' tortures, the dushmans dragged the broken people to the steep bank of the (Mikini). They shot those who could still stand up. They simply pushed the others over the precipice. The river swept the disfigured bodies 3 km downstream with the current. When, after the liberation, people tried to identify the victims, they were totally unable to do so: The faces and bodies of the wretched people were so mutilated.

The West writes a great deal about the "lofty aims" for which the Afghan "mujahidin" are allegedly fighting. It is possible that some people believe this. After all, the dushmans are presented to Western readers, radio audiences, and television viewers in the most decent guise possible. And if there are also reports about schools and hospitals burned down by the bandits and murdered peasants, they try to din into ordinary people's heads that this is "red propaganda."

Nobody will succeed in vindicating the crimes of the Afghan counterrevolution. Nothing can conceal its brutal face, however, it is disguised and whatever banners it appears under.

At a meeting in memory of the Panjsher victims, one of the leaders of the operation to capture the prison--Colonel Zalmay--said:

"We will never forget what we have seen here. The blood spilled by our comrades calls for vengeance."



PRAVDA PROFILES SERVICEMEN UNDER FIRE IN DRA

PM241534 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 first edition p 6

[Special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel I. Taranenko report under the rubric "Afghan Notebook": "Scorching Fortress"]

[Text] An emerald valley suddenly opened up after the deep ravines and snow-covered mountains of the Hindu Kush. The precise, square, well-tended fields of state farms and cooperatives, where grey-bearded elders and inimitable Afghan children were working, stood out sharply against the lush subtropical vegetation framed in pyramids of cypress and spreading eucalyptus trees. It is hard to believe that the idyllic calm might suddenly be broken by the roar of heavy machineguns and exploding mines and shells.

The motor drones evenly, eyes are blinded by the merciless Afghan sun, and the hot wind lashes your face and makes breathing difficult (the temperature is 46 degrees in the shade). Our armored personnel carrier, passing a sarandoy--Afghan militia--post, crossed a noisy iron bridge to the other bank of the canal and drove alone toward the high mountains rising up on the horizon. Caustic loess dust thrown up by the wheels covered everything behind us in an impenetrable fog.

"We do not need a smokescreen to hide from the dushmans," my companion political worker Major L. Torgonskiy joked.

He then remarked to the personnel carrier driver, private Nikolay Liberanskiy, who in avoiding a shell hole had left the marked tract: "Be careful not to hit any mines!" and he explained to me:

"The mines and bombs are often highly sensitive. You are traveling along and there is a stick on the road. You go over it--and there is an explosion. You swerve to avoid a shell hole--and there is an explosion. You catch an antenna on tree branches--and there is an explosion."

I look at the major's sunburned, weathered face--a brave and calm face. I was told about him by the deputy chief of the unit's political section. Leonid Albinovich Torgonskiy's biography is simple: school, military college, service. He is in his second year here in Afghanistan. He has been in many

tight spots. The situation required that he become a commander and he took on the entire brunt of responsibility. That is why he called commissar.

We saw the destroyed, burned village from afar, the empty window frames of the black charred school gazed down onto the road, a pile of smashed bricks lay where the madrasah once stood. There was not a soul around. It was a ghost town.

"(Rudod) village," Leonid Albinovich said. "The work of the mullah (Akhmad)."

Mullah (Akhmad's) gang attacked the village at night. Activists from a self-defense detachment returned the dushman's fire, but the forces were unequal. They and the mother of the secretary of the party cell were burned alive--48 people in all. The schoolchildren guarding their school in the neighboring village then fell victim to the bandits. The dushmans robbed stalls whose owners refused to pay them their "levy" and detonated a bomb in a bus in which workers on an irrigation complex were traveling to work. They ruthlessly shot innocent peasants, mined roads and paths, and dealt viciously with defenders of the revolution. The corpses were taken to other villages and mourning ceremonies were held there, hypocritically convincing the locals that these people had suffered at the hands of Soviet soldiers and the Afghan security service.

The gang was routed and its ringleader--Mullah (Akhmad)--imprisoned. In jail, he told the investigator: "My people trained for 6 months in a training center in Pakistan. There they obtained weapons--mines, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, machineguns, submachineguns, and sniper rifles. We were transferred across the border. Our area of combat action was defined as Nangarhar Province. We were tasked with destroying aircraft and helicopters in a raid on Jalalabad."

And they fired. They fired heavy machineguns and surface-to-air missiles. They even fired on the planes which regularly supply food or belong to the Bakhtar civil air transport agency.

Then an order came from the headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the leaders of the counterrevolutionary "Islamic Party of Afghanistan", to carry out periodic attacks on the airport. The aim was clear: the counter-revolution, which for all these years had sabotaged the roads in order to close them and cut off the supplies of everything necessary for life in Afghanistan's remote provinces, had also declared war on air communications.

The Afghan friends appealed to Soviet servicemen to give help in defending roads and airfields.

Afghanistan's roads and airfields are now ringed by combat guard posts flying flags (red for the Soviets; red, green, and black for the Afghans). Each post is a small fortress defending the republic's future. Their small garrisons are prepared at any moment to repulse enemy attacks both during the day and when the land is covered by the dark unlit night like a yashmak.

Senior lieutenant Aleksandr Akhrimenko--chief of one of the posts--showed us a small but entirely autonomous facility [khozyaystvo] enclosed in a tight defense system. We go up to the observation post along a track dug out of the rock earth to a depth enabling one to walk upright under the lights. The valley stood out sharply. The sentry at the observation post--private Vladimir Kaputin, a former physical education teacher at a Moscow school--reported: "No incidents. No sightings of the enemy."

"Our task," A. Akhrimenko said, "is to prevent any infiltration into the defense zone by the dushmans. Under cover of the evening twilight the dushmans once decided to break into the city from the direction of the deserted village. I had just finished instructing the next guard shift when the shelling began. The dushmans launched 14 rockets against our fortress and then tried to surround and destroy us. There was no confusion. Junior sergeant Ivan Sanev and privates Vyacheslav Khudyakov, Suyun Kurbanov, and Anatoliy Petrov had already experienced shelling and I was not worried about them. That night senior sergeant Stanislav Shchirskiy successfully directed the battle on the left flank of the observation post. He has now left. On leaving for the Ukraine, he took back a rocket fragment as a souvenir."

We inspect the buildings and familiarize ourselves with the servicemen's lives. There are tidy bunks in the sleeping quarters and bookshelves on the wall. A small volume of Pushkin, military memoirs, and specialized literature. Alongside, on the notice board, there are newspaper and journal cuttings about the heroism of our troops who are carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan.

"Have a read," the officer advises. "This one, for instance. That kind of thing is unforgettable."

There were five of them--five Soviet servicemen: Sergeant Vasilii Semenyuk, station chief Vasilii Melnikov, driver and mechanic Gurali Tshitashvili, section commander Viktor Yankin, and junior sergeant Valentin Goncharuk. In an inaccessible mountain region in which the dushmans held sway they ensured communications between an Afghan border subunit and the command.

Once a large dushman gang of several hundred men attacked the Afghan border post under cover of nightfall. Our servicemen could have escaped, but communications would have been broken and nobody in the center would have known what the situation was on the border. So the servicemen embarked on preparing a circle defense.

An alarming night fell. Then a battle which lasted till morning started. There was a moment when the shooting suddenly stopped on both sides. Had the border guards really been able to hold out?!

They gathered together. There was no talking. They had a smoke. Then they each put a grenade in their pockets--just in case--said short, manly goodbyes, and dispersed to their positions. The border guards' shooting and the renewed hail of mines was greeted with relief: the garrison was fighting. For seven

straight hours the dushmans pounded them with guns, mortars, and rocket launchers and sprayed them with machinegun and submachinegun fire. Yankin and Goncharuk were wounded. But they did not let the enemy approach. By morning the dushmans had been repulsed.

In the evening we were sitting under a huge tree whose branches bent down to the ground. The heat had abated. Single shots and the occasional burst of heavy machinegun fire could be heard from the foothills.

The tops of the black mountains stood out against a background of stars. The conversation was the most peaceful imaginable. Home and children--Afghan and ours. And the great mission which has fallen to our servicemen here in Afghanistan--to give aid to the friendly people in defending revolutionary gains and at the same time safeguarding the southern borders of their motherland.

I recalled the words of senior lieutenant O. Pirogov, commander of a small garrison: "They shall not pass."

CSO: 1801/278

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-050  
29 August 1985

MOSCOW TV: DRA ECONOMY 'BECOMING STABLE, DEVELOPING'

LD262009 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 26 Jul 85

[From the Vremya newscast; presented by correspondent M. Neshchinskiy]

[Text] Despite continuing subversive acts by counterrevolutionary bands the economy of Afghanistan is becoming stable and developing.

[video shows women displaying fabrics] These smart fabrics were produced at one of the republic's largest textile combines at Golbahar. Capturing all the hues of this land, the variegated nature of the blossoming valleys and the snowy whiteness of the summits about the clouds, the linen fabrics delight the eye and embellish the life of the Afghan people. The combine provides work for 12,000 inhabitants of the surrounding villages and an opportunity to sell their cotton to the combine for the land workers.  
[video shows aerial view of combine and surrounding area]

However, gloomier events are linked precisely with the life of this combine. The territory of Kapisa Province, which is situated in the direct vicinity of the border with Pakistan is most frequently subjected to the bandit forays of the mercenaries of international imperialism. During one of these forays, pylons on the Naghlu-Golbahar power line, high in the mountains, were blown up. This power line was the lifeblood of the combine. The machinery came to a halt and people were left without work. But like all such acts, this too was doomed to failure. In a very short space of time temporary power generators were delivered here, and then the construction got underway of a diesel power station of 7,000 kw capacity. [video shows pictures of construction work and a power facility, then of an armored vehicle on guard in mountainous terrain] [Video shows the correspondent interviewing Aslam Wazir, who is named as an engineer]

The former feudal chiefs and the large landowners who have fled abroad are fighting against us, Aslam Wazir says. Afghan workers and peasants and the entire people are now uniting in the struggle against their enemies. We workers are restoring everything that has been destroyed by the dushmans so that our enterprise is able once again to turn out products to improve the people's lives. We have a loyal friend in the Soviet Union, and our enemies will not be able to intimidate us.

Once again the eye is being delighted by the fabrics of Golbahar. [video shows women displaying fabrics]

Positions manned by Afghan servicemen and a subunit of the people's militia are on permanent duty right alongside the combine and the station that is being built. [video shows a group of servicemen and an armored vehicle] The heights of folk skill and the majesty of their serviceman's duty--such a combination represents the present day of the Golbahar Combine and the whole republic.

CSO: 1801/278

AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW REPORTS DRA PROTEST ABOUT PAKISTAN'S INTERFERENCE

LD251132 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0230 GMT 25 Jul 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Vladimir Beloshapko]

[Text] Afghanistan's Armed Forces are carrying out successful operations in eliminating bands of counterrevolutionaries. As the BAKHTAR agency reports, one such major band has been wiped out in Parwan Province. A large amount of weapons and ammunition was seized from the dushmans.

A press conference has been held in Kabul at which new facts were revealed about the wide involvement of the Pakistani special services in anti-Afghan subversive activity. Journalists' questions were answered by (Nasir Khan) and (Wahid Shah), Pakistani intelligence employees arrested by security organs, who had been operating under the cover of the Pakistani Embassy. The spysers admitted that they had many years of service in the Pakistani intelligence. They were instructed to recruit agents and collect information about the Afghan Armed Forces.

A note from the Afghan Foreign Affairs Ministry points out that the Republic's government protests decisively against Pakistan's violation of generally accepted norms of international law, and demands a halt to interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

CSO: 1801/278

AFGHANISTAN

SERVICEMEN RECALL DRA EXPERIENCE

PM231348 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 July 1985  
Second Edition carries on page 3 a 2,500-word report by special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Filatov under the headline "highest yardstick for battle," profiling a Lieutenant Colonel Danelyan of the Belorussian military district whose training methods are seen through the eyes of officers returning from Afghanistan.

Senior Lieutenant A. Yarkovyy, a senior battery officer in Afghanistan, states: "the dushmans once carried out a pincer movement attack. They used the mountain terrain well. We had to resort to weapons," Yarkovyy said. 'Of course, this was no shooting gallery [Strelba V Babushkino Kono]. You try to hit the target, but they're trying to hit you. Since then I've put everything into training and I see the commander's demandingness as a boon. For it really is just that.'"

Captain N. Lavrenchuk, a former senior battery officer in Afghanistan, says: "We carried out various tasks over there but the main task was to guard a pipeline and the road running alongside it," Lavrenchuk said. 'The pipeline carried fuel and the road carried trucks with various goods. In Afghanistan the dushmans hit the republic's main nerve -- its roads and pipelines.'" He goes on to speak of the role of Junior commanders: "'in the regiment this category of commanders are given the most serious attention. After all, it is the junior commander who is closest to the soldiers in real combat.'" He even says that "'to a certain extent working with soldiers is easier in Afghanistan... When I left Afghanistan to join this regiment, quite honestly I felt no special enthusiasm: there were the same old firing ranges, the same old exercise locations -- you could shoot and attack with your eyes shut... But, starting from last winter our entire setup changed sharply. There were surprise alerts, and all at night. Our ammunition load was as it would be in a real situation. We were shown a spot on the map and then set off. There were road blocks. And ambushes alongside. We rapidly took up positions, fired three or four shots at the target, broke away and moved rapidly to the next position marked on the map... Everything as it would be in a real battle. That is what demandingness basically means. Does it really offend people? Is it really a bind?'"



Major D. Akhmadeyev, deputy commander of a battalion political unit in Afghanistan, recalls: "'we had to accompany convoys and sweep for mines. We once guarded a section of an important main road. We did a bit of everything,' Akhmadeyev said pensively. 'What did I learn from those events? The most important thing -- the plain truth. And the truth is that each officer in a raging battle, when absolutely everything can change from minute to minute, must be able to lead his subunit and not let go of the reins of battle.'"

#### MINE-CLEARING OPERATION IN DRA DESCRIBED

PM021500 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 85 p 5  
The "Tour of Duty--DRA" Rubric, a 1,600-word Kabul-dated lined dispatch  
entitled "Brave Men" by own correspondent G. Ustinov.

The article describes the role played in the lifting of the rebel siege of the border settlement of Barikowt, Konar Province, by a Soviet engineer-sapper subunit commanded by Georgiy Gil. The sappers' help was requested by the Afghan army command because the approaches to the settlement were "crammed with explosives."

It is reported how the subunit covered 28 kilometers to reach Barikowt, continuing to clear a way even at night, "literally groping their way forward with their probe" as any light would have given them away. The subunit "detected and neutralized more than 100 cunningly disguised charges" and suffered no losses.

Various kinds of mines are described and the difficulties in detecting them recounted. The subunit commander remarks that: "The counterrevolution clearly has some experienced instructors. The dushmans place the mines precisely and try not leave any trace." The presence of metal deposits in the rock also creates problems with the detection equipment. The value of dogs is pointed out, although the intense heat in the region can cause them to tire quickly, a dog handler remarks.

CSO: 1801/289

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-050  
29 August 1985

IZVESTIYA ON AFGHAN PILOT'S HEROISM

PM251506 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 July 1985 morning edition carries on page 5 under the headline "Vanquished Death" a 1,400-word "Afghan Reportage" by correspondent G. Ustinov in Kabul, on the heroism of a wounded Afghan pilot. The pilot in question, (Shirzamin Shirzoy), shot down in a successful bombing raid on a bandits' camp near Khowst, managed to escape across mountainous desert terrain covered in many places with thorn bushes, despite an injury to his arm, the loss of his boots during ejection from the plane, and lack of water and heat which made him lose consciousness several times, Ustinov recounts. The pilot eventually crawled into an army outpost near Khowst at midnight, Ustinov goes on, and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his feat. A year later, (Shirzoy) is serving in air transport and Ustinov concludes by quoting him as saying "Until the revolution is victorious I cannot imagine any other life for myself."

CSO: 1801/278

AFGHANISTAN

PRAVDA ON FLIGHT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

PM241543 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 July 1985 first edition publishes on page 5 a 1,000-word dispatch by special correspondents V. Baykov and V. Okulov datelined Kabul, July, and entitled "In a Foreign Land." It is largely covered by the referent item and contains little additional information. It claims that the Pakistani authorities induce hungry Afghan refugees to commit acts of terrorism by offering them money--5,000-7,000 Afghanis for killing an Afghan soldier, and 10,000-15,000 Afghanis for killing a party activist. The dispatch also claims that Pakistan uses foreign humanitarian aid for the refugees to train and equip mercenaries to fight against the Afghan people, and it cites a report that Afghan refugees living under appalling conditions in a camp protested against the Pakistani authorities but were merely dispersed and arrested by soldiers.

AFGHAN CIVILIANS PROTECTED BY SOVIET ARMY

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad SOVET TURKMENISTANY in Turkmen 29 May 1985 carries a 700 word report on page 4 by V. Vladilov, a TASS correspondent attached to a "border contingent of Soviet forces in the Afghanistan Democratic Republic, describing a number of situations in which the Soviet army comes to the aid of the civilian population. Pointing out that when the army receives the signal to "muster", "in many cases they go to the aid of the local population, protect peaceful motorized columns, struggle against the effects of natural disasters and expedite food shipments to villages which have suffered such disasters." It is added that they also provide immediate support when "bandits" attack motorized columns because "Afghan military should provide help. But, a number of days are needed for this."

CSO: 1835/402

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES CAPTURED BY DRA--Kabul July 30 TASS--Units of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), vigorously supported by the population, have taken prisoner 26 counterrevolutionaries infiltrated from abroad in Kapisa Province. According to BAKHTAR, eighteen bandits were arrested in Nangarhar Province. As a result of successful operations to render harmless gangs of counterrevolutionaries, weapons which were manufactured abroad and also documents and subversive literature testifying to counterrevolutionaries' links with Anti-Afghan centers set up in the territory of some neighboring states, were seized. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0953 GMT 30 Jul 85 LD]

REBELS DEFEATED IN BALKH PROVINCE--The Afghan Armed Forces are inflicting crushing blows against mercenary bands sent onto the republic's territory from abroad. A large quantity of weapons produced in the west was seized during an operation carried out in Balkh Province. Here armed forces of the republic have wiped out more than 100 bandits and counterrevolutionary groupings which were entrenched on Pakistan's territory. During the operation subversive literature printed in Pakistan was also seized. [video shows captured materials] [Text] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Jul 85]

ACTION IN BALKH, LONGAR PROVINCES--Kabul July 7 TASS--The Afghan people and their Armed Forces are resolutely fighting the mercenaries of imperialism and reaction, who cross inside Afghan territory from abroad. According to BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY, powerful strikes were made lately against bandit units in Balkh and Longar Provinces. Many bandits were destroyed. Heavy and light weapons, American- and Pakistani-made munitions were seized. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1025 GMT 7 Jul 85]

CSO: 1812/287

END